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SUMMARY
The existence of an area with a permanent water deficit whose agricultural production 
could be increased through irrigation, combined with the possibilities offered by technical 
advances applied to the hydraulic domain and the appearance of new policies that favoured 
the existence of resources, while allowing them to be «appropriated» by the concessionary 
system, provided the right context for the development of trading companies created to sell 
water for irrigation. The «new» volumes of flow came from the control works carried out 
by Central Government applying a confederate policy in the Segura catchment area and 
allowed the irrigated perimeter to be enlarged and areas with insufficient resources to be re-
endowed. However, the expected surpluses were soon shown to be smaller than expected, 
the concessions established for them were impossible to materialise and the potential area 
for irrigation was greatly oversized. It could be said that the theory greatly overestimated the 
water resources, although the new irrigation system and the activities of the water companies 
did transform a significant area in the Bajo Segura and Bajo Vinalopó areas of the Province 
of Alicante.
The creation of companies selling water for irrigation fell within the framework of the 
ideas held and ratified by nineteenth-century legislation based on respecting the natural order 
when managing water, and was aimed at promoting individual initiative as much as possible 
and keeping the State in a subsidiary role. It was these companies that gradually brought 
about an unprecedented transformation in land use, with lemon trees as the main colonists. 
The new irrigated areas were regarded as «abusive» and led to the drafting of exhaustive 
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regulations. It should also be pointed out that, up to the beginning of the 20th century, the 
organisation of irrigation and its affected area was centred on the meadowland areas and was 
managed by traditional institutions, such as the irrigation associations. A new stage began 
with the entry of private initiative through trading companies. The Compañía de Riegos de 
Levante was the most important of all the companies founded to extract and use water from 
the River Segura.
This company’s exploitation of the concession granted in 1918 to a relative of one of the 
most influential politicians of the Restoration period – J. Chapaprieta – led to the creation of a 
new irrigated area covering approximately 4,000 hectares in the Vega Baja del Segura region 
of the Province of Alicante. The concession was for 500 litres per second to be taken close to 
the mouth of the River Segura, for the irrigation of their own and other land. This latter case 
involved payment for the water. The concession was initially in perpetuity, contravening the 
1879 Water Law, as it included irrigating other users’ land by levying a charge. A sentence 
passed by the High Court in 1923 in response to a request from the hydraulic administration, 
reduced the period of the concession to the 99 years set by law. In 1921, Chapaprieta sold 
his concession to Compañía Riegos de Levante, a pioneering company in the sale of water 
for the transformation of unirrigated land. The company was founded in 1918, with both 
Spanish and foreign capital, to manage a concession for surplus water from the River Segura. 
The main shareholders were the Dreyfus Bank and the National Bank of Paris. The Board of 
Directors included well-known personalities of the time, such as the conservative politician 
Juan de La Cierva, the liberal politicians Rafael Beltrán Ansó and Trinitario Ruiz Valerino, 
King Alfonso XIII and the Bishop of Orihuela, Irastorza. In exchange for agreeing to the 
sale, Chapaprieta arranged «preferential irrigation» for his lands and for those of his partner, 
L. Barcala.
The history of the company was marked by several conflicts, as it saw its interests 
and those of its main allies questioned by the other beneficiaries of the concession. The 
discrimination in favour of the lands of Chapaprieta and Barcala led to protests by the other 
irrigation users, who accused the company of favouring the beneficiaries of the clause 
and allowing them to make abusive use of the water. They also charged the company of 
having enlarged the potential irrigated perimeter excessively, thus that aggravating the water 
insufficiency of the original beneficiaries. The company was also accused of not having 
extracted all the water allowed by the concession. The hydraulic administration, in defence 
of public interest, accepted the complaints of the irrigation users, arguing that there could 
be no special privileges in the distribution of the water and that it could not permit the 
preferential treatment enjoyed by the lands owned by Chapaprieta and Barcala. It was argued 
that the decision was based on the principle of equality when enjoying a public service, 
with the establishment of rigorously-applied and uniform tariffs. They also reaffirmed the 
right to equal treatment that stemmed from the water legislation in force, a principle that 
was reflected by the fact that the water directly affected the properties in question, which 
led to the reversion – finalised in the period of the concession –operating in favour of all 
irrigation users. They therefore accepted the arguments of the irrigation users. Nevertheless, 
special concessions continued to be made in 1961 to the so-called «special regime» estates 
owned by Chapaprieta and Barcala when the concession was sold to Riegos de Levante 
– those estates affected by the clause cited in the purchase contract. In addition, as this 
419
The end of traditional irrigation and the creation of trading companies for the sale of water
Boletín de la A.G.E. N.º 43 - 2007
land amounted to 11% of the total surface area, they were granted 11% of the water to be 
distributed daily. The protests concerning the abusive enlargement of the potential irrigation 
perimeter initially divided the irrigation users into three groups: 1) Those whose lands were 
sited inside the initial perimeter of the concession (2,000 hectares in Rojales, Almoradí and 
Guardamar), who received a preferential right to water for irrigating their lands. 2) Those 
who irrigated using La Reguera (in Orihuela), who could only use surplus water. 3) Those 
whose situation was not legalised, with no rights as they were illegal. They later became two 
groups: one including those whose lands were inside the perimeter of the concession, whether 
the original or that corresponding to legal enlargements, while the second group consisted 
of the remaining irrigation users, who were only granted the right to use surplus water. The 
hydraulic administration accepted the preferential rights of the initial 2,000 hectares and 
regarded as «abusive» the later enlargements, whilst accepting the concession of surplus 
water. However, these decisions were questioned by the irrigation users and revoked by 
a High Court decision in 1974 that declared the areas irrigated by the Comunidad Riegos 
de Levante Margen Derecha before 1933 to be traditionally irrigated areas as regarded 
organisation of the irrigated areas of the River Segura.
The continuous disagreements between the irrigation users and the company selling the 
water spurred the administration to encourage the creation, in accordance with that laid down 
in hydraulic legislation, of the corresponding irrigation association, to which the company 
transferred the concession for the water on the right bank of the River Segura in 1961. The 
Bylaws of the Association defined an irrigated area of 4,183 hectares, thus recording the 
potential surface area for irrigation instead of merely the area corresponding to effective 
irrigation. This involved the recognition of an increase in the area with irrigation rights, 
while in practice the meagre and irregular volumes of flow had led to the irrigation rights 
of the beneficiaries being limited. The Bylaws stated that the water would be distributed 
proportionally to its availability and to demand, with the latter being conditioned by the 
irrigated area and the rights of the co-proprietors. To this end, a strict session-based distribution 
plan was established with sessions oscillating from 20 to 30 days. The sessions had to be 
established in advance, and the volume of flow corresponding to each estate established. The 
sessions laid down could not be changed. As regards the allocations, nobody could request 
more water or use it for longer than they were allowed by law. In the same way, it was 
established that irrigation users could only irrigate their land with the water corresponding 
to their allocation and no other, with the transfer or alteration of irrigation sessions being 
totally prohibited, with the exception of the estates subject to the so-called «special regime», 
which could do so as they were considered as single properties for this purpose. However, 
this prohibition was hardly respected, and there were frequent transfers and exchanges of 
irrigation sessions between neighbouring users to accumulate a greater number of hours of 
water. The recognition in 1974 of these irrigated lands as «traditional» implied, firstly, the 
preferential right of the irrigation users to benefit from the waters regulated by the reservoirs 
in the Segura catchment area, as this meant that the concession of water was not for surpluses 
but for continuously-flowing water to be extracted from the River Segura, meaning that 
its use was not «abusive», but totally legal. However, the application of this right came 
up against the difficulty of obtaining the volumes allocated in the concession from the 
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diminishing resources of the catchment area. This led to them being allocated 5.5 hm3/year 
from the Tajo-Segura transfer. In 1975, the land in the region was also favoured when it was 
declared to be an irrigation zone of national interest, which linked water use to the land and 
let the Central Government carry out work to modernise its agricultural structures.
The real water usage available to the irrigation users of Riegos de Levante on the right 
bank of the River Segura was significantly lower than the volumes they had been allocated, 
both in the stage of exclusive use of the River Segura’s own waters and in the more recent 
stage when the latter were complemented with those from the Tajo-Segura transfer. At no 
time were the 17,25 hm3/year set in the 1918 concession extracted from the River Segura. 
In this regard, it should be understood that the Segura surpluses resulting from the control 
works were overestimated and the potential perimeter in which they could be used for 
irrigation had been oversized. However, it was in the concession period strictly speaking that 
the greatest volumes were extracted from the River, although these never exceeded 75% of 
the amount allocated on paper. As we have already mentioned, it was precisely the difficulty 
in gathering the own resources allocated in the area that led to transfer water being allocated. 
Its arrival meant that a greater allocation was expected. However, this was not the case. The 
amounts coming from the Segura dropped significantly, while the water from the Tajo was 
only able to balance the books for a few of these years. Logically, fluctuations in transfer 
volumes allocated to the region have reflected and continue to reflect the variations affecting 
global management of the ATS. This management has been compromised, along with other 
reasons of a more political nature, by the various drought episodes experienced in the grantor 
catchment area, which have led to a considerable reduction in the volumes released from the 
reservoirs to the receiving catchment area and, as a result, in the volumes allocated to this 
zone. Thus, at the start of the prolonged drought episode of 1980, there was a substantial 
reduction in the surpluses that could be transferred from the Tajo, which meant that the 
resources received during 1980-85 were significantly less than the theoretical allocation 
of 5.5 hm3/year. This situation did not change until half-way through the decade, when the 
volumes transferred increased, although always below the maximum amount programmed 
for the first stage of exploitation of the ATS (600 hm3/year). A new drought episode affected 
the first five years of the nineties, which saw the minimum recorded amounts of both the 
resources extracted from the Segura and those received from the Tajo. The extreme lack of 
resources led to the appearance of a hitherto unknown phenomenon: irrigation using water 
extracted from wells. Most of these wells – known as «drought wells» to underline the 
extraordinary scarcity that had led to them being used – produced very modest amounts, not 
normally exceeding 10 litres/second. These wells were first used in 1992 and remained in 
operation until 1996, extracting 1.5 hm3 during this period. In 1992, the region also received 
an exceptional transfer of almost 0.3 hm3 from the Júcar. The abundant volumes recorded 
in the reservoirs in the headwaters of the Tajo in the hydrological year 1995-96 led to an 
increase in the volumes transferred, with 2000-01 being the first time that the total amount 
scheduled for the first stage of exploitation was released from reservoirs, although this figure 
had been approached in the years prior to this. However, in the year 2000, a fall in own 
resources led to the region turning to wells once again, from which 0.15 hm3 was extracted. 
In 2006, the resources of the region fell to alarming levels (1.1 hm3 extracted from the 
Segura and 0.4 hm3 transferred from the Tajo), and this led to authorisation to exploit wells 
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that had been exhausted by the drought (0.06 hm3) and to the most innovative measure of 
acquiring resources via contracts for the temporary transfer of rights to allow the transfer 
of 0.38 hm3 from the Tajo to the Estremera Irrigation Association and 0.13 hm3 from the 
Segura to an irrigation association in Cieza. All these volumes (0,522 hm3) were distributed 
using the infrastructure of the Tajo-Segura transfer. The post-transfer transport system had 
been used by the region since 1982 to transport and distribute the concessionary allocation, 
while paying the corresponding toll. This allowed the volumes to be extracted from the Ojós 
irrigation channel (Murcia) and not from the river at Guardamar, something that improved 
water quality. Another advantage of this method lay in the fact that the recourses allocated 
were sure to reach their destination.
The cost of water has increased considerably from the early seventies to the present day. 
Until the arrival of the transfer waters in 1982, the price set was that for concessionary water, 
which included all kinds of costs involved in extracting and transporting the water from its 
point of extraction (the river at Guardamar) to the area to be irrigated, with energy costs 
making up a high percentage in this case. From 1982 onwards, the region has been affected by 
two different prices, depending on the origin of the water – concession or transfer, although 
they are combined in one price paid by users independently of the origin of the water. The 
price of the water transferred was that set by Government at the corresponding tariff, but the 
value of own resources was also affected as a result of the change in the extraction point of 
the water and its transport along the post-transfer channels. This involved savings, as the 
volumes flowed by gravity did not have to be pumped but there was the extra cost of the 
corresponding toll. However, the arrival of the transfer waters led to a considerable increase 
in the average price. In the period in question, the value of the resource in constant terms 
almost tripled, although different stages can be identified. The price of water grew below 
the general retail price index up to the late sixites, when it exceeded the inflation rate, and 
it maintained similar levels until the late seventies. Since the concessionary waters were 
added to the transfer waters, their value rocketed, significantly exceeding the growth of 
the general retail price index. A further price rise took place in the mid-nineties, coinciding 
with the time of maximum water shortages, although prices fell in the following years as the 
volumes provided by the Segura and Tajo approached normal levels. 2006 saw a substantial 
increase in the price of water for the region’s users, coinciding with a new episode of extreme 
drought.

